DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

BOARD FOR CORRECTION OF MILITARY RECORDS 

 
Application for the Correction of 
the Coast Guard Record of: 
 
                                                                                BCMR Docket No. 2009-112 
 
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FINAL DECISION 

 

 
 

 

This is a proceeding under the provisions of section 1552 of title 10 and section 425 of 
title 14 of the United States Code.  The Chair docketed the case after receiving the applicant’s 
completed application on March 30, 2009, and assigned it to staff member J. Andrews to pre-
pare the decision for the Board as required by 33 C.F.R. § 52.61(c). 
 
 
appointed members who were designated to serve as the Board in this case. 
 

This  final  decision,  dated  January  14,  2010,  is  approved  and  signed  by  the  three  duly 

APPLICANT’S REQUEST AND ALLEGATIONS 

 
 
The applicant asked the Board to correct his record to show that on October 27, 1972, he 
received a medical retirement for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),1 instead of an admin-
istrative discharge for unsuitability as a result of a diagnosed personality disorder.  He stated that 
he  believes  he  was  erroneously  discharged  for  unsuitability  because  when  he  was  transferred 
from  a  unit  in  Long  Beach,  California,  to  Cleveland,  Ohio,  his medical  records  were  not  for-
warded to his new unit.  In addition, he alleged that his medical records are all from Long Beach; 
that there are none from Cleveland; and that there is no report of his discharge physical in his 
                                                 
1  Post-traumatic  stress  disorder  (PTSD)  is  an  anxiety  disorder  in  someone  who  has  been  exposed  to  a  traumatic 
event in which the person felt “intense fear, helplessness, or horror.”  The symptoms include recurrent recollections, 
dreams, or “flashbacks” of the event, intense distress upon exposure to cues that resemble an aspect of the event, 
avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma, insomnia, increased startle response, feelings of detachment and 
estrangement, increased heart rate, outbursts of anger, and difficulty concentrating.  PTSD symptoms usually occur 
within 3  months of the traumatic event, but the onset of PTSD may be delayed for  years.  American Psychiatric 
Association,  DIAGNOSTIC  AND  STATISTICAL  MANUAL  OF  MENTAL  DISORDERS,  FOURTH  EDITION,  TEXT  REVISION 
(2000) (hereinafter “DSM-IV-TR”), pp. 463-68.  The Coast Guard and the DVA consider PTSD a physical disabil-
ity.  See U.S. COAST GUARD, COMDTINST M6000.1C, MEDICAL MANUAL, Chap. 5.B.11.b.(4) (May 2006) (here-
inafter “2006 MEDICAL MANUAL”); 38 C.F.R. § 4.130.  PTSD did not appear in the diagnostic nomenclature of the 
DSM until 1980.  Schnurr, Paula P., PhD, “PTSD and Combat-Related Psychiatric Symptoms in Older Veterans,” 
PTSD RESEARCH QUARTERLY (National Center for PTSD, Winter 1991), p. 1.  Before 1980, veterans with symp-
toms that would now likely result in a diagnosis of PTSD were diagnosed with “traumatic war neurosis,” “combat 
exhaustion,” “operational fatigue,” “gross stress syndrome,” or “psychoneurosis.”  Id.  The diagnostic criteria for 
PTSD appear on pages 11 and 12, below. 

file.  The applicant alleged that he is still being treated for the medical conditions that caused his 
discharge in 1972, but he did not find out what his problem was until 1998, when he first applied 
for benefits for PTSD.  He alleged that he “knew something was wrong but could not put [his] 
finger on it,” and many doctors diagnosed him with different things.  The applicant stated that he 
has been awarded a 100% rating—70% for PTSD but 100% because of unemployability—from 
the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA). 
 
The applicant alleged that his DD 214 is also unjust because the reenlistment code pre-
 
vents him from reenlisting and the “spin number” (separation code) prevents him from finding 
civilian  work.    He  stated  that  after  his  discharge,  he  was  unable  to  get  medical  attention  and 
remained unemployed until 1977.  Then, after his spin number and reenlistment code were cor-
rected, he “began a career of failed jobs.”  He stated that he was last employed in January 2008 
and was recently released from a locked veterans’ psychiatric unit.  The applicant asked to be 
compensated for the many years he “was unable to know [he] should have received treatment … 
from the V.A. or Coast Guard.” 
 

In addition, the applicant stated that the Board should waive its three-year statute of limi-
tations in the interest of justice because his medical problems were covered up, no one helped 
him, he was not informed of his rights, and he was too young to ask questions.   
 

SUMMARY OF THE RECORD 

 
 
On  September  11,  1970,  the  applicant  enlisted  in  the  Coast  Guard  for  four  years.    He 
attended boot camp in Alameda, California.  Upon graduating from boot camp on November 20, 
1970, he was assigned to the CGC Glacier, which was homeported in Long Beach, California, as 
a seaman apprentice (SA/E-2). 
 
 
On September 2, 1971, the applicant went to sick bay on the GLACIER, complaining of 
feeling hot and cold flashes, an increased heart beat, and insomnia.  He was prescribed Bena-
dryl.2  He complained of the same symptoms the next day and was prescribed Valium.3 
 
 
On  October  8,  1971,  the  applicant  was  transferred  to  a  shore  unit  in  Long  Beach  on 
temporary orders.  The  orders were issued so that he would be available to testify at a  court-
martial.  On October 10, 1971, the applicant went to an outpatient clinic at the U.S. Public Health 
Service  Hospital  in  San  Pedro,  and  complained  of  headaches  and  nervousness.    He  was  pre-
scribed Darvon.4 
 
 
On October 20, 1971, a medical officer in Long Beach stated that the applicant had been 
prescribed Valium at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital in San Pedro on October 18, 1971, 
and had gone to the Naval Hospital REPOSE Annex in Long Beach the next day and was again 

                                                 
2 Benadryl, a brand name for the generic drug diphenhydramine, is prescribed for insomnia.  Beers, Mark H., and 
Berkow,  Robert,  eds.,  THE  MERCK  MANUAL  OF  DIAGNOSIS  AND  THERAPY  (17th  ed.,  1999)  (hereinafter  “MERCK 
MANUAL”), pp. 1410-13. 
3 Valium, a brand name for the generic drug diazepam, is prescribed for insomnia and agitation.  Id. at 1410-13, 
1575. 
4 Darvon, a brand name for the generic drug propoxyphene, is a weak opioid analgesic, or pain reliever.  Id. at 1367. 

On  November  1,  1971,  the  applicant  complained  of  anxiety  and  palpitations  at  the 

prescribed Valium.  The medical officer wrote that the applicant was taking an excessive amount 
of Valium. 
 
 
REPOSE Annex in Long Beach and was prescribed Valium. 
 
 
Annex. 
 
 
 

On November 4, 1971, the applicant’s Valium prescription was refilled at the REPOSE 

On November 10, 1971, a psychiatrist reported the following: 

The patient is a twenty-one year old, single Black, SA, USCG, who was seen today on a routine 
consultation  referred  from  the  REPOSE Annex  for  a  two-month  history  of  anxiety.    I have  had 
previous contact with this patient seeing him in the REPOSE Emergency Room one night for his 
usual symptomatology of chest pain, history of palpitations, anxiety, headaches, and numbness of 
hands and feet.  The majority of this patient’s difficulty appears to be related to a trial in which he 
is testifying at the present time regarding two of his shipmates who planted a bomb on his ship.  
While the patient was on the ship, he was threatened with being thrown overboard and still fears 
reprisal for his testimony.  The patient describes himself as “nervous” all of his life and since he 
seems  to  have  an  inability  to  tolerate  more  than  minimal  stress  anyway,  being  in  a  prolonged, 
moderate to high threatening situation I believe is responsible for the majority of his symptomatol-
ogy. … 
 
DIAGNSOSIS:    (1)    SITUATIONAL ADJUSTMENT  REACTION  (307.3).[5]    (2)  SCHIZOID 
PERSONALITY (301.2)[6] 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS:  The patient has a fairly low tolerance for stressful situations.  Superim-
posed on his low stress tolerance has been a situational difficulty with a high degree of perceived 
personal  threat.    The  psychological  and  physiological  symptomatology  that  the  patient  is 
experiencing will probably continue until he is removed from this threatening environment.  Both 
temporally and spatially, it would be advantageous if the patient could be transferred to another 
part of the country after his testimony, and he would be happiest in the Great Lakes area which 
would be nearer to his home.  I have placed him on a tranquilizing medication with less sedative 
properties.  Haloperidol 1MG, 3 X a day.[7] 

 
                                                 
5 Adjustment disorders are psychological responses to identifiable stressors that result in the development of emo-
tional or behavioral symptoms.  Adjustment disorders normally disappear within six months after the stressors dis-
appear.  DSM-IV-TR, at 679.  The Coast Guard relies on the DSM when diagnosing members with psychological 
conditions.  MEDICAL MANUAL, Chap. 5.B.1.  Adjustment disorders are not considered physical disabilities by the 
Coast Guard and may be cause for administrative separation. Id., Chap. 5.B.3.  Adjustment disorders are now con-
sidered physical disabilities by the DVA only if they are chronic.  38 C.F.R. § 4.130. 
6 A “personality disorder” is “an enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the 
expectations of the individual’s culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, 
is  stable  over  time,  and  leads  to  distress  or  impairment.”  DSM-IV-TR,  at  685.    Types  of  personality  disorders 
include  paranoid,  schizoid,  schizotypal,  antisocial,  borderline,  histrionic,  narcissistic,  avoidant,  dependent,  and 
obsessive-compulsive.  Id.  “The diagnosis of Personality Disorders requires an evaluation of the individual’s long-
term patterns of functioning … .  The personality traits that define these disorders must also be distinguished from 
characteristics that emerge in response to specific situational stressors or more transient mental states.” Id. at 686.  
Personality  disorders  are  not  considered  physical  disabilities  by  the  Coast  Guard  or  the  DVA.  2006  MEDICAL 
MANUAL, Chap. 5.B.2.; 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.127 and 4.130. 
7 Haloperidol is prescribed for severe agitation with psychosis and schizophrenia.  The usual adult dosage is between 
1 and 15 milligrams per day.  MERCK MANUAL, at 1569, 1575. 

On November 15, 1971, the applicant was prescribed Valium, and the doctor noted that 

he would “not be able to perform effectively until he is transferred.” 

 
On November 16, 1971, a military psychiatrist sent the applicant’s command a note stat-
ing,  “If it is feasible [the applicant] should be placed on sick leave for  3 – 4  weeks until the 
court-martial in which he is a witness is over.  His anxiety is beginning to incapacitate him but 
hospitalization is not necessary.” 

 
On December 4 and 7, 1971, the applicant was again prescribed Valium when he com-

plained of nervousness.  On December 7, 1971, the applicant returned to the GLACIER. 
 

On December 10, 1971, the captain of the GLACIER recommended that the applicant be 
transferred across the country because he was suffering from “extreme anxiety” as a result of a 
“hostile environment” he encountered because of his testimony at a general court-martial.   

 
On  January  6,  1972,  the  applicant  was  transferred  to  Station  Cleveland  Harbor,  which 

was part of Group Detroit.   

 
On January 17, 1972, the applicant sought help for chest pain at the U.S. Public Health 
Service Hospital in Cleveland.  Tests were run on February 1 and 11, 1972, and the applicant was 
referred to the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital on Staten Island for further evaluation 

 
From February 15 to 18, 1972, the applicant was hospitalized at the U.S. Public Health 
Service Hospital on Staten Island for evaluation of a heart murmur.  He was found fit for duty 
and returned to his unit in Cleveland. 

 
On April 17, 1972, the applicant sought help for insomnia and was prescribed Librium.8 
 
On June 13, 1972, the applicant sought help for nervousness and was prescribed Serax.9 
 
On June 24, 1972, the applicant went to the emergency room at a Lutheran hospital in 
Cleveland  complaining  of  nervousness  and  insomnia.    The  doctor  noted  that  the  applicant 
reported that he had no history of drug intake.  The doctor prescribed chloral hydrate.10 

 
On  July  25,  1972,  the  applicant  sought  medical  help  for  continuing  nervousness.   The 
doctor reported that the applicant appeared to be suffering from “Depression marked by anxiety 
& agitation.”  He was referred for a psychiatric evaluation. 
 
 
On August 18, 1972, the applicant was admitted to the U.S. Public Health Service Hospi-
tal on Staten Island for a psychiatric evaluation.  On September 14, 1972, the Chief of the Psy-
chiatry Department signed the following report about the applicant: 
 
                                                 
8 Librium, a brand name for the generic drug chlordiazepoxide, a type of benzodiazepine, is prescribed for insomnia 
and anxiety.  Id. at 1410-13, 1518-19. 
9 Serax, a brand name for the generic drug oxazepam, is prescribed for insomnia and anxiety.  Id. at 1410-13. 
10 Chloral hydrate is prescribed for insomnia.  Id. at 1412. 

HISTORY:  This is the 2nd USPHS Hospital admission for this 22-year-old black male, US Coast 
Guard enlisted active EN-3, who is referred here for neuro-psychiatric evaluation of his fitness to 
serve in the Coast Guard.  His referral is from the USPHS Out-patient Clinic in Cleveland, Ohio, 
where  he  was  seen  on  several  occasions  for  evaluation  of  his  complaints  of  “nervousness  and 
headaches”; these evaluations included a psychiatric evaluation (August 12, 1972) by a consultant 
psychiatrist  which gave an impression of psychophysiologic reaction (manifested by headaches) 
and passive-aggressive personality, with a further recommendation that he (the patient) should be 
considered for administrative discharge.  See enclosures. 
 
The patient states that he has had “bad nerves” for “a long time” but that his difficulty with keep-
ing calm and his diminished impulse control have been increasing gradually since his enlistment 
in the Coast Guard 23 months ago, and particularly in the past 6 to 8 months.  He feels that while 
working he is constantly under pressure, and has to exert great self-control to prevent his impulses 
from overcoming him and resulting in a fight; this has happened in the past, and the patient has on 
occasion found it difficult to stop fighting once he started—either in reality or in his fantasy life.  
These  tensions  and  anxieties  engendered  by  the  stresses  and  strains  of  life  in  the  military  also 
manifest themselves in tension headaches (bitemporal) and depression, problems which have also 
increased in the past 6-8 months.  For these reasons the patient feels unmotivated to work in the 
Coast Guard, and desires discharge from the Coast Guard, for which the present admission to this 
hospital was arranged.  His work record and discipline record while in the Coast Guard have been 
unremarkable and uninspiring:  he has generally been able to perform his work adequately, and has 
not had any specific disciplinary actions.  He does feel that the arbitrary treatment which has been 
afforded him in the Coast Guard and his lack of interest in anything he has done while in the Coast 
Guard have been contributing to his present difficulties. 
 
The patient denies an alcohol problem at the present time, and also denies illicit drug use. 
 
PAST HISTORY:  [The applicant grew up in a cohesive and supportive family in Columbus, Ohio, 
and lived there until he joined the Coast Guard.  The applicant said he had had numerous discipli-
nary problems in high school and joined the Coast Guard to avoid being drafted into the Army.] 
 
In general his response to stress in the military has been much like that in school and in life gener-
ally, i.e., to attempt to withdraw from difficult situations rather than to attempt to deal with them. 
 
In addition to this psychiatric history, the patient was hospitalized at this hospital in February of 
this year for evaluation of a systolic murmur (which had been noted on routine physical examina-
tion); this evaluation revealed the murmur to be clinically insignificant. 
 
MENTAL STATUS SCAN:  Revealed an alert, oriented (to time, person, place, and circumstance), 
cooperative black male in no acute distress.  His speech (flow, content and language) were within 
normal limits; he exhibited no hallucinations, delusional material, or suicidal or homicidal thought 
content.    His  calculations  and  reversals  were  performed  adequately;  proverbs  were  interpreted 
rather concretely.  In general, he delivered his story in a rather quick, effortless, and superficial 
manner.  He gave no complaints of headache during the examination. 
 
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:  Revealed a well-developed, well-nourished small black male in no 
acute distress.  Vital signs were within normal limits.  The rest of the physical examination was 
unremarkable  with  the  exception  of  a  3/6  systolic  ejection  murmur  at  the  apex  radiating  to  the 
aoric area and to both carotids, as has been noted in his previous admission to this hospital. 
 
LABORATORY  DATA:   Admission  CBC  and  urinalysis  were  unremarkable.    VDRL  was  non-
reactive.  SMA 12/60 profile, electrolytes and creatinine were within normal limits.  Chest x-ray 
examination revealed “negative chest.” 
 
HOSPITAL COURSE:  The patient was admitted to the open ward, and throughout his hospitali-
zation never presented any difficulties in terms of management or socializations in the ward.  He 

made friends rather quickly, and availed himself of the occupational therapy facilities of this hos-
pital, and generally seemed to enjoy his stay here.  With regard to his performance at occupational 
therapy, the following quote (from an OT progress report) is relevant:  “Patient works well with 
his hands, is doing a wood carving relief and seems to work off hostility with mallet and chisel.  
Works well but is easily distracted by other patients when the carving becomes tedious.”  During 
several interviews with him, the possibility of staying in the Coast Guard came up, an idea which 
he  did  not  like  at  all.    In  addition  to  his  general  complaints  about  the  arbitrary  treatment  from 
superiors in the Coast Guard, the patient stated that he objected to having to work extended hours, 
weekends, and nights although “if I could get a 9-5 desk job in the Coast Guard then I would stay 
in.”  As we discussed this further, it continued to become more and more apparent that if he did 
stay in the Coast Guard with any but the sort of job that he wanted, these continuing difficulties 
(described above) would recur.  Again, every time this possibility was mentioned the patient stated 
that he did not feel that he would “make it” the remaining two years of his enlistment if he had to 
return to his previous unit. 
 
The question of his headaches came up on several occasions and the consensus seemed to be that 
those were related to tension at his work.  In addition, although he never presented any discipli-
nary difficulties while in the Coast Guard, the case did not seem to be of an individual who simply 
had no aggressive impulses, but rather of an individual who was able to control them out of fear of 
retaliation should he lose his temper and his ability to control his impulses. 
 
The gist of the final interview was that the patient would prefer to have a discharge from the Coast 
Guard rather than to try to “stick it out.”  This is certainly in keeping with all of his other state-
ments  regarding  his  staying  in  the  Coast  Guard,  and  again  was  delivered  in  a  superficial  and 
lackadaisical manner. 
 
IMPRESSION:  Immature personality disorder 301.9[11] 
 
CONDITION:  Unchanged 
 
PROGNOSIS:  For continuation in the Coast Guard – poor. 
 
SUMMARY AND  CONCLUSION:    This  is  a  22  year  old  black  Coast  Guardsman  who  has  a 
rather uninspiring record while in the Coast Guard, and that whereas he has had no severe discipli-
nary difficulties on the one hand, on the other he has certainly done nothing to distinguish himself.  
As noted above, the patient has a long history of impulsive behavior and inability to respond to 
stress, and the feeling that one gets from the interviews with him is that he is a rather bland and 
passive individual who has always had difficulties standing up to stresses and strains of life and is 
now  having  particular  difficulties  with  these  problems  in  a  military  setting.    In  general,  his 
response to stress in the military has been much like that in school and in his life generally.  That 
is, to attempt to withdraw from them rather than to have to deal with them.  Again, although he has 
done nothing specific to hasten eagerly his separation from the service, it is very doubtful at this 
point whether he would be able to last for another 2 years while in the Coast Guard, and it is even 
more doubtful whether continuation in the service would be of benefit either to him or to the ser-
vice.  Therefore it is the feeling of the psychiatric staff of this hospital that the patient be separated 
from the service. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS:    1.    Because  the  patient  suffers  from  a  primary  inherent  personality 
defect which is not secondary to any disease or injury and existed prior to entrance into the Coast 
Guard, he is at present unsuitable for further military service. 
 
2.  There are no disqualifying physical or mental defects which are ratable as a disability under the 
standard schedule for rating disabilities in current use by the Veterans Administration. 

                                                 
11 Immature personality disorder (301.9) now falls under personality disorder NOS (not otherwise specified) (301.9).  
DSM-IV-TR, at 729. 

 
3.  The patient was and is mentally responsible both to distinguish right from wrong and to adhere 
to the right and has the mental capacity to understand the action being contemplated in his case. 
 
4.  It is recommended that the patient is not fit for duty pending administrative separation from the 
Coast Guard. 
 
DISPOSITION:    Patient  is  discharged  psychiatrically  not  fit  for  duty  in  the  Coast  Guard,  with 
recommendations as noted above. 

On  October  11,  1972,  the  Commandant  ordered  that  the  applicant  be  discharged  for 

 
 
On September 28, 1972, Commander, Group Detroit notified the applicant in writing that 
the command intended to recommend that he be discharged by reason of unsuitability because he 
had been diagnosed with an “immature personality disorder.”  He advised the applicant that he 
was entitled to submit a statement in his own behalf.  The applicant signed an acknowledgement 
of the notification and declined to submit a statement. 
 
 
Also on September 28, 1972, Commander, Group Detroit recommended to the Comman-
dant that the applicant be administratively discharged by reason of unsuitability because he had 
been diagnosed with an “immature personality disorder, 301.9,” which existed prior to the appli-
cant’s enlistment in the military. 
 
 
unsuitability under Article 12-B-10 of the Personnel Manual with separation code 265. 
 
 
On  October  27,  1972,  the  applicant  signed  a  form  terminating  his  Coast  Guard  health 
record and noted that he agreed with the findings of the doctor who examined him on August 18, 
1972.  The applicant noted that he did not desire to submit a statement in rebuttal of the doctor’s 
findings. 
 
 
Also on October 27, 1972, the applicant was honorably discharged pursuant to Article 12-
B-10 of the Personnel  Manual.  His DD 214 shows that he received separation code 265  and 
reenlistment code RE-4 (ineligible to reenlist).  The applicant’s proficiency marks were all above 
3.0 (out of 4.0) and his conduct marks were all 4.0. 
 
 
A DD 149 form in the applicant’s record indicates that he submitted an application to the 
BCMR in 1977 to have his spin number changed.  (The applicant indicated in his application that 
the spin number and reenlistment code had been corrected by a board.  However, there is no evi-
dence of a decision by either the Discharge Review Board or the BCMR in his record, and the 
DD 214 in his record bears the 265 spin number and RE-4.) 
 
 
DVA records show that the applicant received Veterans Educational Assistance Program 
(VEAP) benefits from the Veterans’ Administration from 1974 until January 1978, when he mar-
ried.  He also sought treatment at a Veterans’ Administration outpatient clinic in January 1975.  
His educational benefits were renewed on November 19, 1980. 
 

 
In September 1989, the applicant was hospitalized for an acute psychotic state with reli-
gious  delusions  and  hallucinations.    He  was  diagnosed  with  a  “brief  reactive  psychosis,”  pre-
scribed Haldol,12 and treated on an outpatient basis. 
 
 
In November 1990, the applicant was again hospitalized in an acute psychotic state.  He 
came to the hospital with five bibles and claimed that Jesus was speaking to him and that people 
were trying to hurt him.  The hospital report shows that the applicant’s diagnosis was paranoid 
schizophrenia and he had been taking Haldol and Cogentin.13 
 
 
On June 25, 1998, the applicant filed a claim for benefits with the DVA.  In a letter, he 
stated  that  he  started  receiving  psychiatric  care  after  the  GLACIER  was  firebombed  and  he 
received  threats.    The  applicant  wrote  that  “[a]fter  being  discharged  from  the  Coast  Guard,  I 
started having dreams of the event; acting and feeling as if the event was recurring through hallu-
cinations.”   The  applicant  told  the  examiner  that  for  several  years  after  his  discharge,  he  fre-
quently went to hospital emergency rooms seeking Valium or Librium and “stayed drunk.”  He 
“drank heavily from 1972 until 1989.”   
 

On October 6, 1998, the DVA denied service-connection for PTSD and bipolar disorder.  
The DVA  stated that there was “no confirmed diagnosis” of PTSD and noted that the applicant 
had been diagnosed with a situational adjustment reaction and immature personality disorder on 
November 9, 1971, and with an immature personality disorder on September 14, 1972, which 
were not ratable disabilities; that he had been found mentally competent; and that he 
 

had no desire to remain on active duty due to the requirement of working extended hours, week-
ends and nights.  The veteran had two years remaining on his original enlistment and stated that he 
would  not  “make  it”  those  remaining  two  years  if  he  had  to  return  to  his  previous  work.   The 
examiners felt that it was doubtful whether continuation in the service would be of benefit either 
to the veteran or the service.  The veteran was discharged from the Coast Guard psychiatrically not 
fit for duty on 10-27-72.  The personality disorders shown in service are not considered disabilities 
for VA compensation purposes. 

 

The DVA also noted that there was no medical record of the applicant having been diag-
nosed with a psychosis during his military service or during the year after his discharge.  He was 
first treated for a psychosis in September 1989, which was “too remote from the period of active 
service to establish a factual basis for the grant of service connection.” 

 
On March 14, 2006, the applicant filed a claim for benefits with the DVA in which he 

wrote the following: 

 
I,  [the  applicant],  give  you  this  information  to  aide  in  helping  to  show  and  state  my  condition.  
First the cover-up of my DD 214 with the spin number.  The nights I wandered the street because I 
could not get rest.  I visited emergency room after emergency room in hope to get Valiums or Lib-
rium or Haldol to get rest.  After the attempted bombing of the Glacier and the threats on my life 
by [name deleted] something or other.  I do remember [name deleted] built the bomb.  No one 

                                                 
12  Haldol  is  a  brand  name  of  the  generic  drug  haloperidol  is  prescribed  for  severe  agitation  with  psychosis  and 
schizophrenia.  MERCK MANUAL, at 1575. 
13 Cogentin is a brand name of the generic drug benztropine mesylate, which is prescribed to reduce muscle spasms 
and tremors.  MERCK MANUAL, at 1469. 

inform[ed] me I would be entitled to these benefits until 1998 when I [was] still going thru prob-
lems.  I can be successful at a job.  I have held only to steady jobs and the first one came after the 
spin number was removed and the Senator stamped PE-60 on my DD 214.  Dr’s only know what I 
tell them.  I stated to the doctors in the Service and they tried to make it sound like anything but 
PTSD and schizophrenia. 
 
DVA reports indicate that the applicant had been under regular psychiatric care for about 
two  years  and  had  previously  been  diagnosed  with  various  physical  and  mental  conditions, 
including bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, anxiety, personality disorder not otherwise specified, 
which was noted to be compatible with his previously diagnosed immature personality disorder, 
depression, past drug and alcohol abuse, and PTSD.  Of all his diagnosed mental conditions, only 
the PTSD was found to be a service-connected disability.  According to a DVA examiner, the 
applicant described the trauma that allegedly caused his PTSD as having two shipmates firebomb 
the GLACIER by setting a bomb on top of a recently filled jet fuel tank near the helicopter pad.  
The applicant was assigned to fire billet duties, and when his team arrived to extinguish the fire, 
someone yelled “bomb.”  He dropped his fire hose and ran for his life off the ship, which was in 
port.  The applicant testified at the crewmates’ court-martial and identified the one who built the 
bomb and put it on the jet fuel tank.  He received threats because of his testimony and thereafter 
suffered insomnia and anxiety, for which he was prescribed Valium and Librium.  After he was 
transferred to Station Cleveland Harbor, he began to drink and to seek treatment at hospitals. 
  

On August 3, 2007, the DVA awarded the applicant a 30% disability rating for service-
connected PTSD.  The DVA stated that service connection had been granted because the appli-
cant  had  proved  that  an  in-service  stressor  occurred;  because  the  applicant  was  treated  for 
psychiatric symptoms that appeared to be related to the stressor; and because the applicant stated 
that he had suffered “recurring nightmares and sweats” since the stressful incident.  On April 7, 
2008, the DVA increased the disability rating to 50%.  On October 3, 2008, the DVA increased 
the applicant’s disability rating for PTSD to 70% and awarded him a 100% rating for unemploy-
ability retroactive to January 19, 2008, when he was fired from his last job. 
 
 
A copy of the applicant’s resume in his DVA file shows that he worked as a youth leader 
for the Ohio Department of Youth Services from 1977 to 1985; as a youth coordinator for St. 
Vincent Family Centers from 1985 to 1990; as a Columbus Public Schools custodian from 1986 
to 1996; as a youth leader in the Ohio Youth Advocate Program from 1996 to 1997; as a residen-
tial specialist for the disabled in Franklin County from 1997 to 1998; as a juvenile detention offi-
cer in Franklin County from 1998 to 2000; as an intervention aide for Columbus Public Schools 
from 2000 to 2001; and as a youth supervisor and behavior specialist for St. Vincent Family Cen-
ters from 2000 to 2008. 
 

VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

On August 11, 2009, the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Coast Guard submitted an 

 
 
advisory opinion recommending that the Board deny the applicant’s requests. 
 
The JAG stated that the application should be denied for untimeliness and lack of merit 
 
because the applicant was aware of his discharge status in 1972 and “has provided no rationale 
for  failing  to  avail  himself  of  the  BCMR  process  in  a  timely  manner.”    In  addition,  the  JAG 

argued, the applicant “has not provided a compelling reason based on the merits as to why the 
Board should waive the statute of limitations in his particular case.” 
 
 
The JAG also adopted the findings and analysis provided in a memorandum on the case 
provided by Commander, Coast Guard Personnel Service Center (PSC).  The PSC stated that the 
applicant’s military medical records contain no evidence that would support his allegation that he 
was entitled to medical board  processing for a medical discharge or retirement.  The PSC stated 
that there is no evidence of a diagnosed psychosis and that members diagnosed with PTSD today 
are treated and are not necessarily processed for medical separations.  The PSC stated that the 
applicant’s  request  should  be  denied  because  his  “symptoms  did  not  present  themselves  until 
approximately 2005 [and] as such there is not redress within the meaning of the law.” 
 
 
The PSC concluded that the  applicant  “has not  substantiated an error or injustice with 
respect to the cause for discharge” because his military medical records show that he was sepa-
rated because of a condition, not a disability.  The PSC noted that members diagnosed with per-
sonality  or  adjustment  disorders  today  are  administratively,  rather  than  medically,  separated 
when their conditions interfere with their performance of duty. 
 

APPLICANT’S RESPONSE TO THE VIEWS OF THE COAST GUARD 

 
 
In response to the Coast Guard’s advisory opinion, the applicant stated that the reason he 
did not file his application sooner was that he “was unable to obtain [his] records due to a lie that 
was  told  about  records  being  burned  up  in  the  fire  at  St.  Louis,  Mo.”    However,  in  2006,  he 
attempted to get his records by calling his congressman, who helped him.   
 
The applicant denied having any pre-existing mental condition when he enlisted in the 
 
service and noted that the report of his pre-enlistment physical examination does not reveal any 
psychiatric  problems.    He  noted  that  although  he  had  some  typical  teenage  issues,  he  had  no 
police record prior to his enlistment.  The applicant also repeated his allegation that he did not 
receive a discharge physical examination and his allegations about the symptoms he has suffered 
since his discharge.   
 

APPLICABLE LAW 

 

Chapter  5-C-1  of  the  Medical  Manual  in  effect  in  197214  (CG-294)  states  that  Coast 
Guard members diagnosed with a personality, character, or behavior disorder should be consid-
ered for administrative discharges under Article 12-B-10 of the Personnel Manual.  The list of 
disorders includes insomnia, situational adjustment reaction, gross stress reaction, schizoid per-
sonality disorder, and immature personality disorder.  Only members diagnosed with psychoses 
or psychoneuroses would be referred to a Board of Medical Survey for potential processing for a 
medical discharge or retirement under Article 17 of the Personnel Manual. 

 
Under Article 12-B-10(a) of the Personnel Manual in effect in 1972,15 the Commandant 
could  discharge  a  member  for  unsuitability  if  the  member  was  diagnosed  with  a  personality, 
                                                 
14 U.S. COAST GUARD, CG-294, MEDICAL MANUAL (1967). 
15 U.S. COAST GUARD, CG-207, PERSONNEL MANUAL (Amend. No. 32, 1972). 

character,  or  behavior  disorder,  alcoholism,  chronic  motion  sickness,  enuresis,  or  a  defective 
attitude or inaptitude.  Article 12-B-10(d) states that a member being discharged for unsuitability 
should be examined by a medical officer of the Public Health Service or the Armed Forces and 
by  a  psychiatrist  if  a  psychiatric  condition  is  involved.    The  psychiatrist  should  determine 
whether the member is mentally competent and/or has a mental disability ratable under the Vet-
erans’  Administration  Schedule  for  Rating  Disabilities  (VASRD),  in  which  case  the  member 
would be referred to a Board of Medical Survey.  Under Article 12-B-10(e), a member being 
recommended for an unsuitability discharge who had less than eight years of military service was 
entitled to notice of the proposed discharge and the reasons therefore and an opportunity to sub-
mit a statement in his own behalf.16 (Members with more than eight years of service were enti-
tled to a hearing before an Administrative Discharge Board.)   
 

Under COMDTINST 1900.4, the instruction for preparing DD 214s, members discharged 
for unsuitability because of a diagnosed personality, character, or behavior disorder under Article 
12-B-10 of the Personnel Manual in 1972 received separation code 265 and reenlistment code 
RE-4.  
 

Article 17-A-1-(h) of the Personnel Manual in effect in 1972 states that “[e]ntitlement to 
disability retirement or separation arises only on a determination of physical unfitness to perform 
duties.  It does not arise at the convenience of the member on the mere existence of a disability 
or a condition ratable under the Veterans Administration Schedule for Rating Disabilities.”  Arti-
cle 17-A-12(c) states, “The mere presence of physical disability or of a disability ratable under 
the Veterans Administration Schedule for Rating Disabilities, or the fact that the evaluee is cur-
rently on the sick list or hospitalized, does not require a finding of unfitness for duty.”  Article 
17-A-1(b) states, “The fact that a member is determined to be unfit for duty while on active duty 
is not sufficient by itself to entitle him to disability retirement or severance pay.  There must be a 
medical conclusion that this unfitness is due to a disability incurred while entitled to basic pay.”  
Article  17-A-10(a)  states  that  “[t]he  term  ‘physical  disability’  does  not  include  such  inherent 
defects  as  behavior  disorders,  personality  disorders,  primary  mental  deficiency,  congenital  or 
developmental defects, or developmental refractive errors of the eye.” 

 
Under  the  Medical  Manual  in  effect  today,  members  are  administratively  separated 
(rather than medically separated) for diagnosed personality or chronic adjustment disorders that 
interfere  with  their  performance  of  duty.17    PTSD,  which  was  sometimes  diagnosed  as  gross 
stress  reaction  before  1980,  is  now  a  ratable  disability  that  may  warrant  processing  under  the 
Physical Disability Evaluation System.18  To be diagnosed with PTSD, the member must meet 
the following criteria:19 

 
A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following have been 
present:  

                                                 
16 Today, members who, like the applicant, have less than 8 years of military service and are diagnosed with person-
ality  disorders  may  also  be  administratively  discharged  for  unsuitability  under  the  Personnel  Manual,  and  they 
receive the same right to notification and to make a statement.  See U.S. COAST GUARD, COMDTINST M1000.6A, 
PERSONNEL MANUAL, Art. 12.B.16. (Change 41, 2007). 
17 2006 MEDICAL MANUAL, Chap. 5.B. 
18 Id., Chap. 5.B.11.b.; see Schnurr, note 1 above, at 1. 
19 DSM-IV-TR, at 467-68. 

(1)  the  person  experienced,  witnessed,  or  was  confronted  with  an  event  or  events  that 
involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or 
others  

(2) the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. Note: In children, … 

B. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in one (or more) of the following ways:  

(1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including images, thoughts, 

or perceptions.  Note: In young children … 

(2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event. Note: In children, … 
(3) acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of reliving the 
experience,  illusions,  hallucinations,  and  dissociative  flashback  episodes,  including  those  that 
occur upon awakening or when intoxicated). Note: In young children, … 

(4) intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or 

resemble an aspect of the traumatic event. 

ble an aspect of the traumatic event. 

(5) physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resem-

C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general responsive-
ness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or more) of the following:  

(1) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the trauma  
(2) efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the trauma  
(3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma  
(4) markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities  
(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others  
(6) restricted range of affect (e.g., unable to have loving feelings)  
(7) sense of a foreshortened future (e.g., does not expect to have a career, marriage, children, 

or a normal life span) 

D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as indicated by two 
(or more) of the following:  

(1) difficulty falling or staying asleep 
(2) irritability or outbursts of anger 
(3) difficulty concentrating 
(4) hypervigilance 
(5) exaggerated startle response 

E. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C, and D) is more than one month. 

F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning. 

 

1. 
 
2. 

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 

The Board makes the following findings and conclusions on the basis of the applicant’s 

 
 
military record and submissions, the Coast Guard’s submissions, and applicable law: 
 

The Board has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552. 

Under 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b), an application to the Board must be filed within three 
years after the applicant discovers the alleged error or injustice in his military record.  The appli-

3. 

 
4. 

 
5. 

cant received his unsuitability discharge in 1972 and first claimed to have PTSD in 1998.  There-
fore, his application is untimely. 
 

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1552(b), the  Board may  excuse the untimeliness of an 
application if it is in the interest of justice to do so.  In Allen v. Card, 799 F. Supp. 158, 164 
(D.D.C. 1992), the court stated that to determine whether the interest of justice supports a waiver 
of the statute of limitations, the Board “should analyze both the reasons for the delay and the 
potential merits of the claim based on a cursory review.”  The court further instructed that “the 
longer the delay has been and the weaker the reasons are for the delay, the more compelling the 
merits would need to be to justify a full review.”20   

Regarding the delay of his application, the applicant stated that his medical prob-
lems were covered up, no one helped him, he was not informed of his rights, and he was too 
young to ask questions.  He also alleged that he “was unable to obtain [his] records due to a lie 
that was told about records being burned up in the fire at St. Louis, Mo.”  There is no evidence, 
however, that any doctors or Coast Guard personnel “covered up” the applicant’s mental condi-
tion or that any Government official told the applicant that his records had been burned.  In addi-
tion, the applicant clearly knew about the BCMR in the 1970s because he submitted an applica-
tion form, and he knew he was entitled to medical care and benefits as a veteran because he vis-
ited a Veterans’ Administration clinic in 1975 and used his VEAP benefits for several years in the 
1970s.  The Board finds that the applicant’s explanation for his delay is not compelling because 
the record shows that he was competent to obtain employment and to assert his rights as a vet-
eran for many years. 

A cursory review of the merits of this case indicates that the applicant’s request 
for a 1972 medical separation and retirement benefits lacks potential merit.  Coast Guard mem-
bers  were  not  in  1972,  and  are  not  today,  medically  separated  from  the  Armed  Forces  just 
because they have a medical condition when they are separated.21  Medical discharges and retire-
ments were and are received by members who are involuntarily separated because a diagnosed 
physical  disability  has  rendered  them  unfit  for  continued  military  service.22    In  this  case,  the 

                                                 
20 Allen v. Card, 799 F. Supp. 158, 164-65 (D.D.C. 1992); see also Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, 68 F.3d 1396 
(D.C. Cir. 1995).   
21  U.S.  COAST  GUARD,  CG-207,  PERSONNEL  MANUAL,  Art.  17-A-1(h)  (Amend.  No.  32,  1972)  (“Entitlement  to 
disability retirement or separation arises only on a determination of physical unfitness to perform duties.  It does not 
arise at the convenience of the member on the mere existence of a disability or a condition ratable under the Veter-
ans  Administration Schedule for Rating Disabilities.”); Id., Art. 17-A-12(c) (“The mere  presence of physical dis-
ability or of a disability ratable under the Veterans Administration Schedule for Rating Disabilities, or the fact that 
the  evaluee  is  currently  on  the  sick  list  or  hospitalized,  does  not  require  a  finding  of  unfitness  for  duty.”);  U.S. 
COAST GUARD, COMDTINST M1850.2D, PHYSICAL DISABILITY EVALUATION SYSTEM, Chap. 2.C.2.i. (May 2006) 
(hereinafter “PDES MANUAL”) (“Although a member may have physical impairments ratable in accordance with the 
VASRD, such impairments do not necessarily render him or her unfit for military duty … Such a member should 
apply to the [DVA] for disability compensation after release from active duty.”). 
22  U.S.  COAST  GUARD,  CG-207,  PERSONNEL  MANUAL,  Art.  17-A-1(b)  (Amend.  No.  32,  1972)  (“The  fact  that  a 
member is determined to be unfit for duty while on active duty is not sufficient by itself to entitle him to disability 
retirement or severance pay.  There must be a medical conclusion that this unfitness is due to a disability incurred 
while entitled to basic pay.”); Id., Art.17-A-10(a) (“The term ‘physical disability’ does not include such inherent 
defects as behavior disorders, personality disorders, primary mental deficiency, congenital or developmental defects, 
or developmental refractive errors of the eye.”); PDES MANUAL, Chap. 2.C.2.b. (“The law that provides for disabil-

record shows that the applicant was discharged because of a diagnosed personality disorder, and 
personality disorders were not and are not considered physical disabilities by the Coast Guard or 
the DVA.23   

Although the applicant alleged that he suffered from PTSD in 1972, his records 
show that he first claimed to have PTSD in 1998 after many years of alcohol and drug abuse and 
hospitalizations for psychotic breaks in 1989 and 1990.  Moreover, according to his DVA claim 
dated June 25, 1998, he started having dreams about the firebombing and threats—an important 
diagnostic criterion for PTSD24—after being discharged from the Coast Guard.  The applicant’s 
military  medical  records  do  not  support  his  claim  that  he  was  discharged  because  of  PTSD, 
symptoms meeting all the diagnostic criteria thereof,25 or one of PTSD’s precedent diagnoses,26 
and these records are presumptively correct.27   

 
6. 

 
7. 

 
8. 

The applicant’s military medical records show that while on active duty he some-
times suffered from anxiety, insomnia, and headaches and was diagnosed with and treated for 
these conditions and for a situational adjustment reaction to receiving threats for testifying about 
a firebombing at a court-martial in the fall of 1971.  He was also diagnosed in 1971 with a schiz-
oid personality disorder and a systolic heart murmur, which was evaluated and found not unfit-
ting in February 1972.  However, the applicant was not discharged because of those conditions; 
he was discharged because of a diagnosed immature personality disorder based on the report of 
his medical evaluation at the U.S. Public Health Service Hospital on Staten Island from August 
18  to  September  14,  1972.    The  report  of  that  evaluation  shows  that  he  received  a  physical 
examination  upon  his  admission  and  was  physically  fit  for  duty  but  not  psychiatrically  fit  for 
duty because of his immature personality disorder (301.9). 

The applicant pointed out that he has received a 70% disability rating for service-
connected PTSD from the DVA, as well as a 100% rating for unemployability.  However, DVA 
ratings are “not determinative of the same issues involved in military disability cases.”28  In addi-
tion, even assuming that the DVA is correct in determining that the applicant’s PTSD is service 
connected, a finding of service connection for PTSD does not necessarily mean that the member 
suffered from PTSD prior to his discharge because the onset of PTSD may occur years after the 

                                                                                                                                                             
ity retirement or separation (10 U.S.C., chapter 61) is designed to compensate members whose military service is 
terminated due to a physical disability that has rendered him or her unfit for continued duty.”). 
23  U.S.  COAST  GUARD,  CG-207,  PERSONNEL  MANUAL,  Art.  17-A-10(a)  (Amend.  No.  32,  1972);  2006  MEDICAL 
MANUAL, Chap. 5.B.2.; 38 C.F.R. §§ 4.127 and 4.130. 
24 DSM-IV-TR, at 468. 
25 Id., at 467-68. 
26 Schnurr, note 1 above, at 1. 
27 33 C.F.R. § 52.24(b); see Arens v. United States, 969 F.2d 1034, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing Sanders v. United 
States, 594 F.2d 804, 813 (Ct. Cl. 1979), for the required presumption, absent evidence to the contrary, that Gov-
ernment officials have carried out their duties “correctly, lawfully, and in good faith.”).   
28 Lord v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 749, 754 (1983); see Kirwin v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 497, 507 (1991) (“The VA 
rating [in 1986] is irrelevant to the question of plaintiff's fitness for duty at the time of his discharge in 1978. Indeed, 
the fact that the VA retroactively applied plaintiff’s 100% temporary disability rating only to 1982, and not 1978, 
gives some indication that plaintiff was not suffering from PTSD at the time of his discharge.”); Dzialo v. United 
States, 5 Cl. Ct. 554, 565 (1984) (holding that a VA disability rating “is in no way determinative on the issue of 
plaintiff’s eligibility for disability retirement pay. A long line of decisions have so held in similar circumstances, 
because the ratings of the VA and armed forces are made for different purposes.”).   

traumatic event.29  Therefore, the fact that the DVA has recently assigned the applicant a 70% 
disability rating for PTSD does not prove that the Coast Guard erred in diagnosing him in 1972. 

The applicant alleged that some of his medical records were lost and that he never 
received  a  pre-discharge  physical  examination.    However,  the  records  received  from  the  DVA 
include medical records from the applicant’s time in recruit training, from his service aboard the 
GLACIER and in Long Beach and Cleveland, and from his hospitalizations on Staten Island.  In 
addition, the Staten  Island hospital report dated September 14, 1972, shows that the applicant 
received a physical examination upon his admission to that hospital on August 18, 1972, and was 
also examined by a psychiatrist, as required by Article 12-B-10(d) of the Personnel Manual then 
in effect.  Moreover, the applicant signed a form on October 27, 1972, agreeing with the findings 
of that physical examination. 

 The record indicates that the applicant received all due process with respect to his 
discharge proceedings in 1972.  As required under Article 12-B-10 of the Personnel Manual then 
in effect, he was notified of the reason for his pending discharge on September 28, 1972, and 
afforded an opportunity to submit a statement, which he declined.  These are the same rights that 
a member diagnosed with a personality disorder has today.30  The Board finds that the applicant’s 
claim that his failure to be medically retired and his receipt of an unsuitability discharge were 
erroneous and unjust lacks potential merit. 

 
9. 

 
10. 

 
11. 

 
 

The  applicant  complained  about  his  RE-4  reenlistment  code,  which  made  him 
ineligible to reenlist in the Armed Forces, and his “spin number” (separation code) 265, which 
denotes a discharge for unsuitability because of a diagnosed personality, character, or behavior 
disorder under Article 12-B-10 of the Personnel Manual.  Although the applicant indicated that 
he  believes  his  separation  and  reenlistment  codes  have  been  removed  from  his  DD  214,  they 
have not.  The DD 214 in his official military record still bears these codes, and there is no DD 
215 or other evidence of correction in his record.  The RE-4 and separation code 265 are the 
codes that were assigned for members who, like the applicant, were being discharged because of 
a diagnosed personality disorder.31  The applicant has not shown that the codes are erroneous or 
unjust.32 
 
12. 

Accordingly, the Board will not excuse the application’s untimeliness or waive the 

statute of limitations.  The applicant’s request should be denied. 

[ORDER AND SIGNATURES APPEAR ON NEXT PAGE] 

 
 
                                                 
29 DSM-IV-TR, at 466. 
30 U.S. COAST GUARD, COMDTINST M1000.6A, PERSONNEL MANUAL, Art. 12.B.16. (Change 41, 2007). 
31 U.S. COAST GUARD, COMDTINST M1900.4, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
CERTIFICATE OF RELEASE OR DISCHARGE FROM ACTIVE DUTY, DD FORM 214, Encl. (2) (1973). 
32 For the purposes of the BCMRs, “‘[i]njustice’, when not also ‘error’, is treatment by the military authorities, that 
shocks the sense of justice, but is not technically illegal.” Reale v. United States, 208 Ct. Cl. 1010, 1011 (1976).  
The Board has authority to determine whether an injustice exists on a “case-by-case basis.” Docket No. 2002-040 
(DOT BCMR, Decision of the Deputy General Counsel, Dec. 4, 2002). 

The  application  of  xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx,  USCG,  for  correction  of  his 

ORDER 

 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 

 
 
 

 

 
 Donna M. Bivona 

 

 

 
 
Evan R. Franke 

 

 
 James E. McLeod 

 

 

 
 

 

 

 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

military record is denied.